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The Democracy of Justice-The Jury.
to those who perceive the nature and extent of the danger. It is
peculiarly the province of lawyers to lead in this great movement
which must be undertaken before it is too late.
From the beginning of the government to this day the lawyer
has nobly responded to every appeal, to his patriotism, to his
ability and to his courage. The present appeal makes infinite call
upon each of these qualities. I feel confident that as in the -past
with other great questions, this great national question will receive such attention and treatment at your hands that the nation
will some day realize the debt it owes you for the great duty that
you will perform.
-0

THE DEMOCRACY OF JUSTICE-THE JURY.*
By Delphin M. Delmas.

In endeavoring to estimate the present value and to predict
the future fate of trial by jury, it is but natural to seek guidance
and instruction from the experience of the past.
That experience teaches the familiar lesson that trial by jury,
as it is the most ancient, has been the most enduring of all the
political and judicial institutions which have flourished among the
English speaking peoples. Coeval with the earliest dawn of organized society in Britain, its origin is lost in the mists of antiquity.
Though in a crude and rudimentary form, it had existed for centuries when the Norman invader set foot upon English soil, and
it survived the general wreck of the English laws and customs
which followed in the wake of his conquering footsteps. The hand
of time, beneath which all other institutions underwent alteration
or decay, left is untouched. The march of ages, which swept away
other great achievements of human polity, but served to confirm
it. The wars and revolutions, which uprooted weaker growths, but
* By courtesy of Southwestern Law Review.
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strengthened. the hold which it had upon English earth, and -endured its trunk to defy still mightier storms. In the long unfolding of centuries, it saw kingly houses, founded in the confident
hope of perpetual succession, rise, flourish and vanish, leaving no
trace behind; it saw the Tudor dynasty overthrow the Plantagenet,
the Stuart succeed the Tudor, the Hanoverian supplant the Stuart;
it saw the feudal system crumble into dust, and upon its ruins rise
the structure of .modern society;. it saw the crown of spiritual. supremacy pass from the head of the Pope of Rome to the head of
the M onarch of England;.it saw the scepter of empire and-of rule,
fallen from the nerveless grasp- of the nobility, snatched up and
grijpped by the strong hand' Of the- Commons in Parliament assem.bled; it saw the kingly office decline from the rank which gave it
once a voice potential in the affairs of the state, to become an empty
dignity, best fitted to grace'a s6cial function, or adorn a public
show; it saw the material wealth of the realm transferred from
the baronial-halls of the landed aristocracy to the counting houses
of merchants, money changers and bankers in Leadenhall and Lombard street; it saw the whole frame of legal procedure recast and
remolded, antique forms grown hoary'.with age abandoned, the constitution and the name of courts consecrated, by the lapse of 6enturies fulndamentally altered, and the whole fabric of .the:judicial
hierarchy rebuilt from turret to foundation stone-all this it saw,
and, amid the universal .wreck of things which" seemed endowed
with enduring life, it alone, defying time and change, stands in 'all
the essentials of a popular tribunal,, as- it stood in. the years when
Edward the..Confessor sat upon the throne of England.
As no -other institution ever struck its roots so deep into the
hearts of the English speaking races, so to none have they clungwith equal tenacity, -As -long as the people continue to govern
themselves, so long shall it - endure among them. Its de cay will
mark the decadence,. and. its overthrow the end of popular liberty.
The gre~t commentator, upon the laws of England has described it as '-'the glory'of the English-law," as '"the .most trailscendent. 'privilege which any suibject can enjoy, and as I"the
best preservative of English liberty." Speaking, of it, the- greatest
of English adyocates has said:. "What is it that distinguishes the
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government of England from the most despotic monarchy? What
but the security which the subject enjoys in a trial and judgment by
his equals?" A volume would be required to record the words
which have been uttered in our own country by eminent men in
its praise.
I therefore venture to reaffirm that trial by jury shall endure
among us as long as the people continue to govern themselves. Its
decay would mark the decadence, and its overthrow be the end of
popular government. For I hold it true that, for the practice and
the perpetuation of self-government, the right of the people to administer their own laws is no less indispensable than their right
to make them.
The essential function of all governments of free men is to
administer justice-in other words, to regulate the conduct of the
community in accordance with the dictates of that instinctive sense
of right and wrong which exists in the breast of every man. By the
light of that sense each individual guides his footsteps through
life and shapes his conduct toward his fellow men. By that same
light too he is guided when called upon in a station of authority
to regulate the conduct of others. Whenever on this earth a rule
is promulgated for -the government of human beings-whether by
the master of a ship in mid-ocean or by an Indian Chief in his wigwam, and whether by an absolute monarch, or by the people themselves through accredited delegates-the rule is ever the expression of the lawgiver's sense of justice. And it is manifest that, in
a representative government, the individual legislator has no other
norm to determine his vote upon schemes of legislation than his own
personal sense of justice. Equally manifest it is that, -in such a
government, the law is nothing more than the formal expression of
the people's collective, sense of justice, voiced through accredited
representatives.
That, in a government in which the people's will is the supreme authority, the people have a right to make their own lawsto give formal expression to their own sense of justice-no one denies. To deny it would involve an obvious contradiction in terms.
No less undeniable is it that, in such a government, the people have
an equal right to enforce their own sense of justice in and through
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the administration *of those laws. Being the source of all authority
and power, they may select their own methods of reaching this end.
They may reach it directly and immediately, as in a pure democracy, or, as in a representative government, they may reach it
through their authorized agents. In our country, the people's
sense of justice is enforced by delegation-by judges and by.juries.
There are not wanting those who claim that this double representation is unnecessary not only, but mischievous; that justice
is best administered-inded, can be administered only-by men
who have made of jurisprudence their special study; that such
alone can adequately, understand and properly expound the law;
and that it is little less than folly to confide the rights of litigants
into the hands of -untrained and unlearned persons devoid of the
special knowledge which should constitute an indispensable guide
to a correct judgment. Such is the attitude of those who would
see trial by jury abolished-as-to borrow the language of one of
their number--"a relic of barbarism."
Since the aim of all judicial proceedings is justice, the tacit
assumption underlying this objection to trial by jury is, that better justice will be obtained through judges than through jurors.
If this assumption is true, it silences, of course, all further discussion. The question is, Is it true?
Assuming for the .present, that an exact and unbending enforcement of the law were the worthiest and most laudable end of
a judicial tribunal, it would still remain to inquire whether that
end would be certain of -attainment through the instrumentality
of judges. Were jurisprudence an exact science, were its rules
fixed and unvarying, were its verities like the truths of mathematics, and like them capable of such demonstration as to compel
universal assent, the claim that such a science could best be expounded by those who through special study had mastered its mysteries would be undeniable. Bit nothing is more certain than that
jurisprudence is not such a science. To -refute those who might
claim otherwise, it suffices to refer to the history of our own courts
for the last century. What do the recorded proceedings of these
courts during that period proclaim? "They proclaim that law is a
science upon whose principles the most learned and conscientious
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of jurists entertain the most conflicting views; that judges, sitting
upon the same bench and dealing with the same question, are often
as wide apart as the poles in the determination of what the law is;
that upon the same subject different courts announce different doetrines; that the same tribunal may repudiate today a decision
promulgated by it yesterday; and that the preponderance of opinion of what is accepted as a legal truth over what is repudiated as
a legal heresy is often reached in the same court by the narrowest
possible majority.
We need seek no further for an instance and an illustration of
this assertion than the reports of the Supreme Court of the nation for the last quarter of a century. It is a historical fact, deserving of the most attentive consideration, that, during this period, upon occasions when issues of prime magnitude and overshadowing importance have come up for adjudication, the decision
of the court has, by a species of perverse fatality, been, in nearly
every instance, rendered by a bare majority of one. Nor have the
divergencies which have characterized the conflicting-opinions of:
nembers of that exalted tribunal been less fundamental than frequent. Did space permit or the occasion require, nuimberless dissents expressed in terms of vehement, if not indignant, protest
against the views of the majority could readily be adduced. But
these are familiar to every lawyer.
Let no man have the temerity to imagine that what I have said
is intended to lessen the respect of the people for the judiciary, or
to inspire them with distrust of their decisions. To point out their
imperfections is but to say that they are human. Being human,
the differences of opinion between different courts and between
members of the same court are easily accounted for. It needs but
to recall that men are but men, even though they be judges; that
elevation to the bench is not an apotheosis, which endows the human soul with the attribute of a godlike infallibility; that the
judicial ermine casts no blighting shade, beneath whose upas-like
influence all human sentiments and passions wither and perish;
that, like other men, judges, even in the discharge of their high oflice, may unconsciously experience the emotions of love or of hate,
may be swayed by the promptings of ambition or warped by the
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blight of prejudice; that, like those of other men, their hearts may
soften with sympathy or be inflamed by resentment. Moreover,
men reach the bench at a period of life, when the formative epoch
has been passed, when their natures are set, their characters
formed, their mental habitudes fixed, their moral principles settled. No material change is at that time reasonably to be expected.
What the man then is, for better or for worse, he remains to the
end. He brings with him upon the bench his own political opinions, his own views upon questions of governmental policies, his
own attitude toward sociological problems, his own conception of
the proper relations of the different classes of society and of their
respective rights. He has and retains his own partisan afiliations,
his own social duties, his own family ties, his own religious beliefs
or unbeliefs.
Nor could these imperfections be obviated by recruiting the
judiciary-were such a thing possible-only from among men of
the most exalted character and most commanding intellect. These
imperfections are inherent in and inseparable from human nature.
They exist among the greatest as among the humblest. Had Daniel
Webster and John C. Calhoun both sat upon the bench in Washington, in 1830, and the question had come up before them whether
the Constitution is or is not a compact between sovereign states,
would anyone have expected them to concur in a decision? Would
anyone have imagined that the opinions which each had entertained for a lifetime, had solemnly defended on numberless occasions, had made the very basis of his public career, would now
be abandoned? Would it have rbquired great sagacity to predict
where, on such a question, the great Nullifier from South Carolina
and the great Defender from Massachusetts would take their stand?
When the decision of the House of Lords in the celebrated
case of Allen v. Flood, which dealt with the relative rights of capital and labor, was rendered by a divided court, the leading English law journal editorially said that, in that contest, "politics took
sides," and that "the decisions of English judges could be predicted from their political leanings."
Has not the same thing
taken place in our own country? When the Electoral Commission sat, in 1876, did any one doubt that the fourteen members
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selected equally from-each political party.would in voting, divide
upon all essential questions according to their political affiliations?
Did any one doubt that the decision of the question, Who shall be
the next President? depended wholly- upon the question, To' what
party shall the fifteenth member belong? And did anyone doubt
that, when fate had decreed that that member should be a Republican, Mr. Hayes, and not Mr. Tilden, was destined to be declared
elected? And this even though the person who thus had the casting vote was a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
venerable in years, honored for the exalted purity of his character,
and universally admired for his learning as a jurist.
To contend, in view of what has been said, that jurisprudence
is an exact science, or that it is certain that the administration of
justice-assuming that to be the same thing as the exact and unbending enforcement of the law-:will be unerringly attained if left
exclusively to judges, would be a manifest delusion.
But, a still larger question remains to be answered. Is it true
that an exact and unbending enforcement of the law is the most
desirable function of human tribunals-in other words, the highest reach of human justice? And is it true that the loftiest conception which can be formed of a judge is that of one who, in the
discharge of his office, looks to the law, and to the law only, as his
sole guide, and to its unbending enforcement as his sole duty?
The most perfect conception of a magistrate is that of a just,
not that of a learned, judge-of one who, knowing the law, also
knbws that it deals with imperfect, not perfect, beings, that it is
made for men, not for angels, and that its administration must
subserve the purposes,-not of a divine, but of a human justice. No
higher conception of the functions of magistracy has ever been
formulated than that of the Roman lawgiver, who enjoined that,
in all -proceedings, regard should be had to justice and equity
rather than to the strict mandate of the law--"Ptacuit in omnibus
rebus praecipuam esse justitiae equitatisque quam stricti juris rationem." No less profoundly human was the aphorism of Roman
jurisprudence that the exaction of the fullest measure accorded
by the law may constitute the height of injustice-to use the terse
epigram of the latin text: Sumnuan jus summa injuria.. In the
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imperfect condition of all human affairs, it not seldom becomes
indispensable to subordinate the attainment of one desirable object
to the attainment of another still more desirable-to exp'and or to
restrict the mandate of the law, in order to compass justice.
That all preeminently great judges have pursued this course,
and that their greatness is grounded upon the fact that they.have
followed it, their lives and their works abundantly attest. Upon
what does the fame of Lord Mlansfield rest, if not upon this, that
his genius liberated justice from the shackles in which the unbending rules of the common law and the narrow conservatism of common law judges held it in thrall? Upon what, if not upon'the fact
that, under the sway of his mighty intellect, the artificial barriers
which separated the administration of law from the administiation
of equity were swept away, and the principles of natural justice
were made the groundwork of his decisions? Whence springs the
debt of gratitude which the commerce of England owes to him, if
not from the fact that his daring hand it was that b rushed aside
the cobwebs of antiquated forms and obsolete methods of prbcedure, born of a former age and adapted to an extinct civilization,
which held it bound, and permitted the merchants of England to
govern theiic business by the equitable rules which constitute the
universal Law Merchant of the world?
And is not the same true of the great judges of our own country?
Chancellor Kent has left a well known letter descriptive of the
methods which he followed in the discharge of his judicial duties.
In this letter, it stands recorded that it, was his custom first, to
make himself accurately familiar with the facts of the case; that,
when this task was accomplished, he had usually reached the judgment which his sense of justice prompted; and that he then consulted the book to search for the rules of law which supported
his conclusion-and, of course, seldom failed to find them.
Of another great American, one who, next to Marshall-if,
indeed, second even to him-was, by common consent, the greatest
judge that ever sat upon the bench of the Supreme Court of the
United States-of Samuel F. Miller, it was said, at the time of his
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death, that "he was wont to wipe away the law, in order that justice might prevail."
One of the most eminent of judges, lawyers and law-writers,
which this or any age has produced-one who still lives to enjoy
in the ripeness of years, the fruits of a long and.illustrious career
-has left, as the recorded result of his long experience on the
bench and at the bar, these memorable words:
"I always felt, in the exercise of the judicial office, irresistibly drawn to the intrinsic justice of the case, with the inclination,
if possible the determination, to rest the judgment upon the very
right of the matter. In the practice of the profession, I have always
felt an abiding confidence that, if my case is morally right and jiist,
it will succeed, whatever technical difficulties may appear to stand
in the way, and the result usually justified the confidence."
In what does that vast stream of 'jurisprudence, technically
called by the name of "equity," have its source, if not in the violence done by magistrates to positive law, in order to accomplish
justice? To show this, one single illustration, out of a score that
might readily be cited, must suffice.
It was the common law of England that the land given *in
pledge by way of mortgage, in case of non-payment at the time
limited, was forever dead and gone from the mortgagor, and that
the mortgagee's estate then became absolute. When an English
Chancellor first allowed a debtor who had thus lost his property
a space of time to get together the principal, interest and expenses,
and upon payment of this, to regain his estate, where did he find
a warrant for his decree? Not in the law; he was proceeding in
violation of the law. Not in the agreement of the parties; he was
acting in the teeth of their agreement. Not in the protection of
vested rights; he was taking away from a man an estate legally
his. Where then? Where, if not in the dictates of justice-of a
justice, the attainment of which was, in his eyes, more desirable
than the observance of the law? And where did he find this sense
of justice whose behests he obeyed? Not in the law; the law was
the. other way. Not in the books; there was no precedent. Not
in the statutes; Parliament had not, spoken. Where, then, if pot
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in himself? Where, if not in that instinct which God has implanted in the breast of every man, and which, without the aid of
code or statute or .legal commentary, teaches him to distinguish
right from wrong, to abhor the insolence of power, to succor the
-oppressed, and to protect the weak against the rapacity and the
violence of the strong? Where, if not in the impulse, common
to every right-minded man, to yield obedience to the exhortation,
uttered on a not dissimilar occasion, by one of the characters of
Shakespeare, and which irresistably moves him to
"Wrest once the law to his authority;
To do a great right, do a little wrong."
At the time the Chancellors of England thus began to dis
regard the undoubted law of the realm, in order to compass jus
tice, the second period of the evolution which takes place in ever3
system of jurisprudence had been reached. The first is that ii
which the body of. magistrates, losing sight of their true mission
place the administration of the law beyond the reach and compre
hension of the community, by surrounding it with ceremonial
which they alone understand. A rigorous insistence upon th(
strict observance of the rules of that science, which they arrogat,
unto themselves as their own exclusive province, becomes then thi
chief solicitude of the judicial body. Thus it was that, in thi
early days of Rome, the administration of the law grew to be thi
privilege of a chosen class, which, in order to exalt their dignit.
and to maintain their monopoly, insisted upon a literal compliane
with, the formularies prescribed by themselves
for the institutioi
and the maintenance of actions allowed for the enforcement o
civil rights. The result was that the function of a judge was n,
longer the administering of justice but the enforcement of forms.
That the common law of England passed through the sam
process is too familiar to need comment.
The second period in the evolution of jurisprudence is tha
in which a reaction takes place against the jealous conservatism a
the judicial body, and the demand is for justice-plain, ordinar3
every-day justice. That period was reached in Rome when th
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praetors began to assume as the basis of their decisions the principles of the law of nature. It was reached in England when, in
the days of Edward III, the Chancellor commenced to relieve
suitors from the rigors and the inadequacy of the common law, in
order to subserve the purposes of justice.
The advance thus commenced toward a better kind of justice
than the mere rigid enforcement of the law has never since ceased.
From that day to this, both in England and in our country, the
current has been constantly setting toward the prevalence of the
precepts rather of justice than of law. It was one of the greatest
of chancery judges-Lord Redesdale, I believe-who said that
the principles of equity are gradually but steadily being adopted
by the courts of law and that the rule of chancery of today becomes tomorrow a common law doctrine. That conception is embodied in the statute enacted during the reign of Queen Victoria,
directing that, in all decisions, preference shall be given to the
equity rule over the common law rule.
Thus, bearing in mind that the decrees of chancery proceed
"according to the principles of conscience, good faith, honesty
and equity," it is not difficult to perceive the goal toward which
the administration of justice nowadays is tending. That goal
is the universal recognition of those great principles, which, being
deduced from natural reason, are equally diffused over all mankind, and are not subject to alteration by any change' of place or
time.
And now, the final question remains, In the trial of juridical
controversies, into whose hands shall the application of these
Shall it be intrusted to
fundamental principles be confided?
judges, or to juries? Shall it be given to a body of men which
represents but one class of the community, or to a body composed
of all classes? Shall it be exercised by those whose studies, pursuits, associations and official dignity necessarily remove them
from contact with the mass of mankind, or by those, who being
brought in daily touch with their fellow men, know by personal
experience their ideas of justice? Shall it be given to those who
are the people's equals, or to those who assume to be their superiors?
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For my own part, I have no hesitation in answering this question. Believing in self-government, I believe in the right of the
people to make their own laws. Believing in the right of the people to make their own laws, I believe in their right to administer
them. If they are not competent to do both, they are competent
to do neither. As laws are the formal expression of the people's
sense of justice applicable to future possible conduct, so verdicts
are the expression of the people's sense of justice brought to bear
upon past actual conduct. In one case, the popular will is voiced
by accredited spokesmen called legislators; in the other it is voiced
by equally accredited spokesmen called jurors. In the one, the
rule prescribed is an abstract expression of the people's will; in
the other, it is a concrete application of that will The ultimate
aim in both is justice-the people's justice.
I give my fullest assent, therefore, to the memorable words
uttered by one of the great Chief Justices of England of the Victorian age, who summed up his judicial experience by saying:
"A jury trial gives expression to the sense of justice of the
people, which is the nearest approach to absolute justice attainable
in earthly tribunals."
May this institution, which, after having stood for ages as the
bulwark of the liberties of Englishmen, was brought here as their
birthright by the colonists who first landed upon the banks of the
James and up6n the shores of Massachusetts, which. they cherished
with such devotion that its violation by the king was 6nmierated
by them as one of the grounds justifying rebellion, which, so soon
as their independence had been achieved, they' embodied in the
Constitution as a fundamental right of American citizens, and
which every American state has since incorporated into its organic law-may this venerable institution, which has come down
to us unimpaired through the lapse of centuries, abide with us
ket, and remain sacred and inviolate forevermore.

